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Abstract
“Sense of agency” (SoA), the feeling of control for events caused by one's own
actions, is deceived by visuomotor incongruence. Sensorimotor networks are impli-
cated in SoA, however little evidence exists on brain functionality during agency
processing. Concurrently, it has been suggested that the brain's intrinsic resting-state
(rs) activity has a preliminary influence on processing of agency cues. Here, we inves-
tigated the relation between performance in an agency attribution task and func-
tional interactions among brain regions as derived by network analysis of rs
functional magnetic resonance imaging. The action-effect delay was adaptively
increased (range 90–1,620 ms) and behavioral measures correlated to indices of cog-
nitive processes and appraised self-concepts. They were then regressed on local
metrics of rs brain functional connectivity as to isolate the core areas enabling self-
agency. Across subjects, the time window for self-agency was 90–625 ms, while the
action-effect integration was impacted by self-evaluated personality traits. Neurally,
the brain intrinsic organization sustaining consistency in self-agency attribution was
characterized by high connectiveness in the secondary visual cortex, and regional
segregation in the primary somatosensory area. Decreased connectiveness in the
secondary visual area, regional segregation in the superior parietal lobule, and infor-
mation control within a primary visual cortex-frontal eye fields network sustained
self-agency over long-delayed effects. We thus demonstrate that self-agency is
grounded on the intrinsic mode of brain function designed to organize information
for visuomotor integration. Our observation is relevant for current models of psycho-
pathology in clinical conditions in which both rs activity and sense of agency are
altered.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The prevalent definition of sense of agency (SoA), that is, the feeling
that we are intentionally making things happen by our own action
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b), encapsulates the two layers of
such experience: that over the performed actions (i.e., body agency)
and that over external events (i.e., external agency) (Farrer &
Frith, 2002). Body agency emerges from a low-level implicit sensori-
motor integration between motor commands and sensory feedbacks
regarding the body. Though, external agency is based on spatial and
temporal tight contiguity between actions and effects enabling the
learning of causal relations between one's behavior and environmental
changes. Further high-level conceptual processing form an attribution
judgment of agency (JoA) integrating context cues, background beliefs,
and post-hoc inferences, as to ascribe an action to the self's or some-
body else's agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a).
The comparator view model (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002;
Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001), which
dominated research on SoA for decades, essentially proposes that JoA
is generated by comparing a predicted outcome of intended motor
plans to the actual proprioceptive/visual feedback information
(i.e., sensorimotor integration). Accordingly, two types of internal
models are implemented in the central motor system to control and
optimize motor behavior: the inverse model to determine the motor
commands necessary to achieve a desired state, and forward models
to allow the system to predict the expected sensory feedback of a
motor command. The sense of agency particularly hinges on the for-
ward model, which uses an efference copy, that is, a copy of a motor
command predicting respective sensory consequences (Blakemore
et al., 2002; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). When the prediction is con-
gruent with the actual outcome, then agency is attributed to the self
(i.e., self-agency attribution) (Gallagher, 2007); if not, then agency is
attributed elsewhere (Frith et al., 2000). To form an attribution JoA, a
precise intentional content is needed followed by an effect that
resembles this content. Information about the operation of intermedi-
ate mechanisms that select the proper course of action to achieve the
desired effect is then used to causally relate intentions to subsequent
actions (Chambon & Haggard, 2013).
The multifactorial weighting model (Synofzik et al., 2008a), going
beyond sensorimotor integration defined in the comparator view
model, decomposes the SoA into agency determination through the
motor control system (Chambon & Haggard, 2013) and by more con-
ceptual processes. This last model defines that many different agency
cues are constantly weighted according to their reliability in a given
situation (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Vosgerau & Synofzik, 2012). The
importance of the different authorship signals varies depending on
task, context and person (Synofzik et al., 2008a).
Whereas the fact that the SoA emerges from the interactive com-
bination and integration of internal and external cues is corroborated
by several behavioral studies (Moore & Fletcher, 2012), the sources of
neural signals which permit external agency are yet to be determined.
Brain regions involved in the motor system (the ventral premotor cor-
tex, the supplementary motor area and the cerebellum) constitute a
network for sensorimotor transformations and motor control, while
heteromodal association cortices (the prefrontal, parietal and temporal
cortex) are implicated in more conceptual cognitive processes (David,
Newen, & Vogeley, 2008). Causal belief of agency changes the
dynamics of sensorimotor networks, determining activity and connec-
tivity modifications, with strengthened communication between the
motor and temporal, parietal cortices and reduced participation of
networks involved in predictive comparison process for mismatch
detection (Buchholz, David, Sengelmann, & Engel, 2019).
Concurrently, abnormalities in sensory cortices are supposed to
underlie the erroneous attribution (self-triggered vs. externally trig-
gered) of the action sensory feedback (Kikuchi et al., 2019; Martikainen,
Kaneko, & Hari, 2005; Shergill et al., 2013). However, a basic sense of
subjectivity is required for the high-order conceptual attribution of the
effect to the self (it is I who is causing it) (Barandiaran, Di Paolo, &
Rohde, 2009; Salomon, 2017; Synofzik et al., 2008b; Tsakiris, Haggard,
Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005). Indeed, disrupted SoA has been primar-
ily ascribed to self-related pathology with misidentification of the
source of internally generated stimuli, that is, the agent (e.g., delusion
of control in schizophrenia) (Frith, 2005; Frith et al., 2000; Keefe,
Courtney, & McEvoy, 1997; Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, &
Leube, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010).
Since the self is assumed to be purely based on internal
processing (Boly et al., 2008; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, &
Raichle, 2001; Northoff, Qin, & Feinberg, 2011), it has been suggested
that the brain's on-going intrinsic activity (i.e., the resting-state
(rs) activity of the brain) may influence the implicit sensorimotor and
high-level conceptual processes leading to the causal self-attribution
of an effect (Robinson, Wagner, & Northoff, 2016). Crucially, the sup-
posed correspondence between self-referential and rs processes in
certain regions of the brain, that is, the self-rest overlap (Bai
et al., 2016; Northoff, 2016a), is substantiated by recent fMRI (Davey,
Pujol, & Harrison, 2016; Huang et al., 2015; Murray, Debbané, Fox,
Bzdok, & Eickhoff, 2015) and neurophysiological studies (Wolff
et al., 2019). Indeed, it has been suggested that the global spontane-
ous brain dynamics resulting from the temporally evolving patterns of
interaction between different brain areas are directly related to the
sense of self at a mental level. As the brain's rs activity can integrate
neural activity over longer stretches of time, the integrative function
of the self on the psychological level of SoA will be based on its tem-
poral continuity. Such spatiotemporal continuity and integration
would be manifest at both the neuronal and the mental level, thus
providing the “common currency” of both brain and self (Northoff,
Wainio-Theberge, & Evers, 2019).
This paradigm shift moved research from the localization of func-
tional areas relevant to self-agency attribution to the investigation of
large-scale functional connectivity networks (Greicius, Krasnow,
Reiss, & Menon, 2003) representing the neural architecture of the self
(Gusnard et al., 2001). Thus, a new model of agency was proposed
(Robinson et al., 2016) as to experimentally test the influence of ongo-
ing rs cerebral activity in attribution JoA. It also allowed the scientific
investigation of functional connectivity patterns-unconfounded by
processing of specific stimuli and cognitive demands-relevant to
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self-agency attribution. By defining the brain on the basis of its spon-
taneous temporo-spatial dynamics rather than neurocognitive, this
larger and more comprehensive framework enables the investigation
of mental features (like the sense of self), which cannot be limited to
the short and discrete moments in time and space as functions
(Northoff et al., 2019).
Taking into consideration these premises, we aimed at exploring in
healthy people, in the framework of network theory (Barabási, 2016),
the relation between performance in an agency attribution task measur-
ing self-agency and brain rs-functional connectivity. In particular, we
aimed at unearthing the network of functionally related areas involved in
information processing and integration sustaining self-agency attribution.
It has been suggested that the positive sense of agency reflects
the default state of brain networks associated to sensorimotor inte-
gration. Thus, we expected as a global property across subjects, cen-
trality measures from network analysis to vary along with self-agency
experience within sensory and motor networks related to the online
monitoring of sensorimotor signals (Cui et al., 2014).
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Subjects
Forty naïve healthy subjects (male N = 15) participated in this study.
All subjects were carefully screened for a current or past diagnosis of
any DSM-5 Axis I or II disorder using the SCID-5 Research Version
edition (SCID-5-RV: First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2014) and the
SCID-5 Personality Disorders (SCID-5-PD: First, Williams, Benjamin,
& Spitzer, 2016). Inclusion criteria were: (a) age between 18 and
65 years, (b) normal or corrected to normal vision (c) at least 8 years
of education, (d) suitability for MRI scanning. Exclusion criteria
included: (a) a history of psychoactive substance dependence or abuse
during lifetime (b) a history of neurologic illness or traumatic brain
injury with loss of consciousness, (c) major medical illnesses, that is,
diabetes not stabilized, obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma,
hematological/oncological disorders, B12 or folate deficiency as
evidenced by blood concentrations below the lower normal limit, per-
nicious anemia, clinically significant and unstable active gastrointesti-
nal, renal, hepatic, endocrine or cardiovascular system disease, newly
treated hypothyroidism, (d) the presence of any brain abnormality and
microvascular lesions apparent on conventional FLAIR-scans. The
presence, severity and location of vascular lesions was computed
using the semi-automated method recently published by our group
(Iorio et al., 2013), (e) the presence of motion-related MRI artifacts
hindering data pre-processing, (f) IQ below the normal range
according to TIB (Test Intelligenza Breve, Italian analog of the National
Adult Reading Test—NART–) (g) global cognitive deterioration
according to a Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein,
Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) score lower than 26, (h) major or mild
neurocognitive diagnosis according to DSM-5 criteria (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013), (i) personality disorder, any present mental
disorder and past major mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, major depressive disorder, etc.), (j) non-Italian language
native speaker, (k) color blindness as referred by the subject.
2.2 | Neuropsychological and behavioral
assessment
In order to assess the cognitive processes related to SoA
(i.e., attention and executive functioning, [David et al., 2008]) and
after having being screened for global cognitive impairment using the
Mini-Mental State Examination test (Folstein et al., 1975), all study
subjects underwent a neuropsychological battery performed by a
trained neuropsychologist. The Multiple Features Targets Cancelation
test (Gainotti, 2001) evaluated selective attention abilities. The Trail
Making Test parts A and B (TMT-A and TMT-B) (Reitan, 1992) were
administered to appraise speed of information processing (TMT-A)
and set-switching ability as a measure of cognitive flexibility and exec-
utive functioning (TMT-B). The Stroop Word Color test (Stroop, 1935)
was used to evaluate attention (word reading and color naming time)
and cognitive flexibility (reading time for color words printed in incon-
gruent ink). The Wisconsin Card Sorting test short-version
(Greve, 2001) evaluated executive processes. As to explore the poten-
tial relationship between SoA and psychological/evaluative aspects of
the self (Gillihan & Farah, 2005), the Temperament and Character
Inventory-revised (TCI-r) Italian-version (Fossati et al., 2007) was
administered. This self-report questionnaire measures four tempera-
ment traits (harm avoidance, reward dependence, novelty seeking and
persistence) and three character dimensions (self-directedness, coop-
erativeness and self-transcendence). Last, since it has been hypothe-
sized that the SoA depends on a time window within which the
signals related to the action and to the effect have to be integrated
(Kawabe, Roseboom, & Nishida, 2013), subjects underwent a time-
color discrimination task (modified from Coull et al., 2011) in order to
control for time perception and working memory abilities.
After applying exclusion criteria, two male subjects were excluded
due to MRI artifacts and the total sample reduced to 38 subjects. All par-
ticipants were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
They gave written informed consent to participate after the procedures
had been fully explained. The study was approved and carried out in
accordance with the guidelines of the IRCCS Santa Lucia Foundation
Ethics Committee. Data supporting the findings of this study are avail-
able on request from the corresponding author and not publicly available
due to privacy or ethical restrictions. The study was founded by Italian
Ministry of Health RC17, RC18, RC19 and 5Xmille 2018–2019 “Multi-
dimensional study of timing abilities and sense of agency in schizophre-
nia and bipolar patients” and by the National Research Council (CNR) “A
multifactorial intervention for successful aging” CUP J84I20000250005.
2.3 | Experimental tasks
The experiment took place in two separate sessions. The two behav-
ioral tasks (Figure 1) were administered in the same session with order
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of tasks counterbalanced across subjects. MR acquisition always pre-
ceded tasks administration within a 24 hr interval.
The agency attribution task measures participants' control judg-
ments over a subsequent consequence of an action by asking to make
an explicit attribution (“self-triggered” or “externally triggered”) of a
visual event. The sense of self-agency here measured was experimen-
tally manipulated by introducing visuomotor temporal incongruity (see
below), and personally graded delay conditions were provided as to
derive the individual time window for the action-effect integration. The
task was generated and stimulus presentation controlled using E-Prime
2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) on a Toshiba Satellite Pro
R850-1C8 with a screen refresh rate of 65 Hz. Participants were seated
about 70 cm in front of the screen and required to fixate a white cross
(duration randomly varying between 1,000 ms and 1,500 ms) at the
center of a black background and to press with their non-dominant
hand the space bar, whenever they felt ready, once the fixation cross
had disappeared. Since we were interested in measuring participants'
explicit control judgments over a delayed visual event, the dominant
hand was used to give the response, and reaction times in the judgment
condition collected. The key press action triggered the appearance of a
blue ball (2.06 in visual angle, 500 ms duration) at the centre of the
screen. Figure 1a depicts the task timeline.
Immediately prior to the experimental task, participants underwent
a training session of 20 trials, where the ball appeared 100 ms after the
key press. Such training condition was meant to establish a strong
causal relation between the key press action and the ball appearance.
In the following experimental task subjects were told that the ball
appearance would be either caused by their own action or controlled
by the computer when in fact, the ball appearance was always trig-
gered by the subjects' key press. As we aimed at establishing the time
window of agency attenuation (as an index of self-agency), the delay
between the key press and the ball appearance was systematically
varied using two different staircase procedures: a descending one
(70 trails with a starting delay of 1,620 ms) and an ascending one
(70 trails with a starting delay of 90 ms) in a total of 140 trials. The
delay range was chosen on the basis of previous reports (Farrer,
Valentin, & Hupé, 2013) demonstrating a strong perceived control
when the action-effect delay was between 0 and 335 ms, and a loss
of sense of control over the effect for delays longer than 708 ms. In
each session the two procedures were interleaved and randomized in
order to avoid participants' habituation to the experimental delay
manipulation. In both procedures the delay was increased by 90 ms
when subjects reported they caused the effect, and decreased by
180 ms when the symbol appearance was attributed to the computer.
Such weighted up-down psychophysical procedure, where the step
upward (delay increase after a correct response) is half the step down-
ward (delay decrease after an incorrect response) targets the 80.3%
level on the psychometric function (Kaernbach, 1991).
F IGURE 1 Experimental tasks. (a) Explicit Judgment of agency task. A key press (action) triggered the appearance of a blue ball (effect) after a
delay (90–1,620 ms) varied according to a weighted up-down psychophysical procedure where the delay was increased by 90 ms when subjects
reported they caused the effect, and decreased by 180 ms when the symbol appearance was attributed to the computer. (b) Time and color
discrimination task. In the time condition, participants estimated whether the duration of the second (probe) stimulus was shorter (S), equal to (=),
or longer (L) than the previous (sample) stimulus. In the color condition, participants estimated whether the probe was redder (R), equal to (=), or
bluer (B) than the sample. Participants estimated the average shade of purple (maroon, violet or indigo) by amalgamating all shades presented
during rapidly alternating stimuli presentations (90 ms)
PIRAS ET AL. 4027
On each trial, participants were required to judge, according to a
two-alternative forced choice: (a) “my space bar press directly trig-
gered the ball”; (b) “the computer triggered the ball”, who was the
agent that caused the ball appearance. We defined the first response
“full control” and the second “no-control”. Participants laid two fingers
of their right hand on two keys of the numeric keypad (Key 1 and Key
2, respectively) and they had to respond as rapidly as possible by
pressing one of the response keys.
The time and color discrimination task was administered to measure
individual perceptual sensitivity in temporal perception and working
memory abilities directly implied in the self-agency indexes here quanti-
fied. Within the two (time and color) conditions the trial structure and
stimuli used were identical, with the only difference being whether par-
ticipants were asked to make time or color judgments (Coull
et al., 2011). In the time condition, participants estimated whether the
duration of the probe stimulus was shorter (S), equal to (=), or longer
(L) than the previous sample stimulus. In the color condition, partici-
pants estimated whether the probe was redder (R), equal to (=), or bluer
(B) than the sample. The response screen presented three alphanumeric
characters, indicating each of the three possible responses for each
condition. Participants pressed one of the three corresponding
response buttons (left, middle or right) to indicate their estimate of rela-
tive duration or color. The response screen appeared for 5 s, during
which the subject gave their response, and any response slower than
5 s was not recorded. Inter-trial intervals varied pseudo-randomly from
1 to 2 s. Figure 1b depicts both the time and color discrimination task.
Participants performed 18 trials per condition, comprising an equal
number of trials in which the probe was shorter than/longer than/equal
to the sample in the time condition, or bluer than/redder than/equal to
the sample in the color task. The time and color conditions were
counterbalanced across two blocks of 18 trials, with each block com-
prising 9 trials of either the time condition or the color condition. The
sample and probe stimuli were presented consecutively, separated by a
pseudo-random inter-stimulus interval of 1,500–4,500 ms. Each stimu-
lus was presented for one of three durations (540, 1,080 or 1,620 ms),
and had an overall percept of one of three shades of purple (maroon,
violet or indigo) ranging from a reddish to a bluish hue. Duration and
color stimulus attributes were counterbalanced such that any of the
three stimulus durations was paired with any of the three colors. The
stimuli to be estimated were not a uniform color for the entire duration
of stimulus presentation. Rather, rapidly alternating presentations
(90 ms) of five different shades of purple across the entire stimulus
duration gave an overall percept of maroon, violet or indigo. During the
color task, the participant estimated the average shade of purple by
amalgamating all shades presented during the flickering percept. This
rather unusual color task has been designed to ensure that subjects
maintain attention, and continually update their color estimate through-
out the entire stimulus presentation. Such manipulation is crucial for
equating sustained attention and working memory demands across the
time and color tasks since time perception necessitates attention being
sustained for the entire duration of the stimulus (1 s), whereas per-
ception of a static color would occur within the first 100 ms or
so. Likewise, time perception requires stimulus onset to be held in
working memory and then continually updated as time elapses,
whereas perception of a static color would require no such updating of
working memory.
2.4 | MRI
rs-fMRI data were collected using gradient-echo echo-planar imaging at
3 T (Philips Achieva) with a (T2*)-weighted imaging sequence sensitive
to blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) (TR = 3 s, TE = 30 ms,
matrix = 80 × 80, FOV = 224 × 224, slice thickness = 3 mm, flip
angle = 90, 50 slices, 240 volumes). A thirty-two channel receive-only
head coil was used. A high-resolution T1-weighted whole-brain struc-
tural scan was also acquired (1 × 1 × 1 mm voxels). Subjects were
instructed to lay in the scanner at rest with eyes open. For the purposes
of accounting for physiological variance in the time-series data, cardiac
and respiratory cycles were recorded using the scanner's built-in photo-
plethysmograph and a pneumatic chest belt, respectively.
Several sources of physiological variance were removed from
each individual subject's time-series rs-fMRI data. For each subject,
physiological noise correction consisted of removal of time-locked
cardiac and respiratory artifacts (two cardiac harmonics and two respi-
ratory harmonics plus four interaction terms) using linear regression
(Glover, Li, & Ress, 2000), and of low-frequency respiratory and heart
rate effects (Birn, Diamond, Smith, & Bandettini, 2006; Chang &
Glover, 2009; Shmueli et al., 2007).
rs-fMRI data were then preprocessed as follows: correction for
head motion and slice-timing and removal of non-brain voxels (per-
formed using FSL: FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).
Head motion estimation parameters were used to derive the frame-
wise displacement (FD), which in turn was used, together with its deriv-
ative, to correct data by a regression process. Time series were then
demeaned, detrended, despiked and band-pass filtered in the frequency
range 0.01–0.25 Hz, using custom software written in Matlab (The
Math Works). For group analysis, a two-step registration process was
performed. rs-fMRI data were transformed first from functional space
to individual subjects' structural space using FLIRT (FMRIB's Linear
Registration Tool) and then non-linearly to a standard space (Montreal
Neurological Institute MNI152 standard map) using Advanced Normali-
zation Tools (ANTs; Penn Image Computing & Science Lab, http://
www.picsl.upenn.edu/ANTS/). Finally data were spatially smoothed
(5 × 5 × 5 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel).
2.5 | Statistical analyses
For Agency Data analysis, the number of “full control” responses was
calculated at each temporal delay and normalized to the total number
of trials. Number of correct responses, false alarms and missing
responses was calculated for the time condition in the temporal and
color discrimination task.
Agency attribution data were modeled using Matlab (The
MathWorks) and color-duration discrimination data were analyzed
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using R. In the former, for each participant, the normalized (to the
total number of trials, i.e., 140) number of full control responses
across the sampled delays was fitted to a Gaussian function. One par-
ticipant was excluded from further analyses due to bad fitting results
(R2 = .23). Therefore, 37 subjects (mean age = 31.1, SD = 13.5; mean
educational attainment = 15.6, SD = 2.6; male N = 12) composed the
final study sample.
The delay corresponding to the curve peak value was taken as
the Point of Subjective Equality (tPSE), representing the delay time at
which probabilities for “full control” and “no-control” responses are
equal (50%). The curve peak value expressed how rapidly performance
changed with changes in delay: the highest the value, the fastest sub-
jects reached their PSE, being very consistent in their agency attribu-
tions. Indeed, the adopted psychophysical procedure increased the
delay between the key press and the effect when the latter was
attributed to the self. Therefore, small delays at which participants
tended to have a full-fledged sense of control over the ball were not
shown again, while delays at which participants tended to experience
a partial sense of control were repeatedly sampled. The curve SD
expressed the range of delays at which uncertainty was high: the
wider the curve, the strongest the temporal grouping between the
action and its effect, as subjects tended to have a sense of control
over the ball at both small and longer delays.
Crude correlations between the peak value of individual curves
from the attribution agency data and accuracy from the time and color
discrimination task, and between the peak value of individual curves,
neuropsychological testing raw scores indexing attentional and execu-
tive abilities, and subscales scores from the TCI-r were computed
using the Fisher r-to-z transformation implemented in Statview. The
same analyses explored the correlation between the SD of individual
curves and time/color discrimination accuracy, neuropsychological
testing raw scores and subscale scores from the TCI-r. In order to con-
trol the expected proportion of incorrect rejections (Type I errors), sig-
nificance was set at a False Discovery Rate (FDR) (Benjamini &
Hochberg, 1995) = 0.05. Table 1 summarizes the derived behavioural
indices.
In the Network-Agency analysis, rs-fMRI time series were aver-
aged, for each participant, within 100 regions of interest (ROIs), com-
bined in seven networks, and including cortical and sub-cortical
regions based on a rs-and task-based fMRI atlas characterized by
functionally and connectionally homogeneous parcellations (Schaefer
et al., 2018). A functional connection between two brain regions was
assumed as an undirected and weighted graph link with the weight
being the square of the correlation coefficient (Caldarelli, 2010). Here
the squared correlation coefficients were considered as similarity indi-
ces (Goelman, Gordon, & Bonne, 2014), in order to account for the
sign of correlations that result from neural-mediated, temporally and
spatially heterogeneous, hemodynamic mechanisms. The resulting
matrix was thresholded by maintaining the graph fully connected, that
is, implying that the number of graph components is equal to the
graph size (de Pasquale, Della, Sprons, Romani, & Corbetta, 2016).
Degree centrality (DC; Newman, 2010) and clustering coefficient (CC;
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998) were used to characterize network topology
in terms of connectedness and segregation at the local level. Between-
ness centrality (BC; Newman, 2010) was assumed as a measure of the
influence each region had over the flow of information within the
network.
In order to find regions where the network topology measures
were related to perceived control judgment across subjects a step-wise
regression approach was used. Network measures from the 100 brain
regions as independent variables, and individual curve peak values as
dependent measures were included in the analyses to investigate
TABLE 1 Agency attribution task: Investigated process and behaviorally derived indices
Studied phenomenon
Sense of agency (SoA): The feeling that we are intentionally making things happen by our own actions




I'm controlling my own action and through it, external events (e.g., The feeling that I'm causing something to move)
Self-agency: I take myself (and not someone else) as the agent of the effect caused my action (e.g., When my intention is
followed by an effect that resembles this content)
Behavioral measures
Attribution JoA Here measured as participants' explicit control judgment over a delayed (range 90–1,620 ms) visual effect (the
appearance of a blue ball)
Full control: my space bar press directly triggered the ball appearance
No-control: the computer triggered the ball appearance
Derived indices (agency
attribution task)
Individual fitting to a Gaussian distribution of normalized (out of 140 trials) full control responses across sampled
delays (based on a staircase procedure increasing the action-effect delay when the latter was attributed to the
self)
1. Mean curve peak delay (action-effect delay for 50% full control responses: Point of subjective equality, tPSE) delay
at which SS shifted from full control to no-control responses
2. Mean curve peak value (proportion of full control responses at PSE) consistency in attributing the effect to self at a
certain delay
3. Curve SD (range of delays at which subjects tended to have a partial sense of control over the effect) extent of the
time window for self-agency attribution
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reciprocal dependencies that maximize the statistical explanation of
perceived control over the effect. Network measures from the consid-
ered brain regions were also regressed on the SD of individual curves.
So as to look at relationships without inflating the risk of a Type I error
(Draper & Smith, 1998), and to increase the number of descriptors in
the regression equation as to improve predictors' fit, a forward step-
wise multiple regression model (F > 4 to enter) was chosen. Indeed, the
forward stepwise procedure starts with no variables in the model and it
tries out the variables one by one, including them if they are statistically
significant, thus identifying the best set of predictors that gives the big-
gest improvement to the model. Simple linear regressions were prelimi-
narily performed to include, in subsequent multiple regressions
analyses, only variables significantly (p < .05) related to the behavioral
measures considered. Multicollinearity between variables was tested by
calculating the tolerance value of each viable predictor, that is, the pro-
portion of variation in each predictor independent from the correlation
between regressors (Berk, 1977). The cutoff value for including vari-
ables in multiple regression analyses was set such that the variability in
a predictor not related to other variables in the model was at least
larger than 30%. All statistics were performed on StatView statistical
software.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Agency attribution task
At the group level, the mean curve peak delay (tPSE) was 625 ms
(SD ± 288.52), while the mean curve peak value, was 0.21 (SD ± 0.06).
Across subjects, variability within delays determining self-agency atten-
uation was 16 ms. A significant negative correlation across subjects
was found between the curve peak and the tPSE, (r = −.61; z = −4.97;
p < .0001) as well as between the curve peak value and the curve SD
(r = −.68; z = −4.97; p < .0001). No significant (using an FDR = 0.05)
correlation was observed between individual curve peak values, SD of
individual curves and neuropsychological testing raw scores indexing
attentional and executive abilities. A significant negative correlation
was observed between TCI-r derived measures of the harm avoidance
temperament dimension and the peak value of individual curves
(r = −.393; z = −2.23; p = .025, FDR adjusted p = .041). A significant
positive correlation was also observed between the peak value of indi-
vidual curves and the personality trait of cooperativeness (r = .352;
z = 1.97; p = .048, FDR adjusted p = .048). A significant negative corre-
lation was additionally found between the SD of individual curves and
the personality trait of self-directedness (r = −.35; z = −1.96; p = .046,
FDR adjusted p = .046).
3.2 | Time and color discrimination task
Within an identical setup, participants were asked to make time or
color judgments (Coull et al., 2011) by estimating whether the dura-
tion of a probe stimulus was shorter, equal to, or longer than a sample
(temporal condition) or whether the probe was redder, equal to, or
bluer than the sample (color condition). Data were available for a total
of 34 studied subjects.
As for the temporal condition, mean accuracy in the study group
was 84% (±0.1 SD) implying a very high sensitivity in discriminating
the sampled temporal intervals. Mean accuracy in the color condition
was 74% (±0.15 SD). No significant (using an FDR = 0.05) correlations
were observed between time and color discrimination accuracy and
values expressing how rapidly performance changed with changes in
delay or variability within delays at which uncertainty was high.
Table 2 reports demographic characteristics and behavioral results in
the studied sample.
TABLE 2 Demographics and descriptive statistics for
neuropsychological and behavioral tests
Demographics
N (mean) SD Range (min–max)
Gender. Male (%) 12 (32.4) — —
Age. Years 31.1 13.5 21–64
Education 15.6 2.6 8–21
Neuropsychological and
behavioral measures Mean SD Range (min–max)
TCI-r novelty seeking 21 6.11 3–33
TCI-r harm avoidance 14.16 7 1–31
TCI-r reward dependence 14.34 4.6 1–23
TCI-r persistence 4.57 1.55 1–8
TCI-r self-directedness 31.5 7.38 8–44
TCI-r cooperativeness 32.5 7.27 8–40
TCI-r self-transcendence 12.69 6.74 1–28
MMSE 29.56 0.75 27–30
Stroop reading (s) 13.47 2.96 8–22
Stroop color (s) 17.07 2.91 12–23








TMT-A (s) 39.62 13.5 2–70
TMT-B (s) 72.03 28.61 35–175
TMT-B-A (s) 30.79 24.61 4–142











Abbreviations: MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination; TCI-r, Tempera-
ment and Character Inventory-revised; TMT, trial making test; WCST,
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
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3.3 | Brain topological organization in self-agency
attribution
3.3.1 | Local connectedness, segregation and
information flow related to perceived control over the
effect
The covariance between the explicit attribution judgment of
self-agency and the centrality of nodes within the whole functional
connectivity network was investigated. Results from simple linear
regressions showed significant positive correlations between curve
peak values and the degree centrality in bilateral frontal, parietal and
occipital regions, as well as between the curve peak values and the
clustering coefficient in left temporal and right parietal and occipital
cortices (see Table 3). Moreover, a significant covariance between the
betweenness centrality of right cingulate and parietal, and left frontal
cortical nodes and the curve peak value was found both as negative
and positive correlations (see Table 3). Results from the subsequent
stepwise regression showed that covariance between curve peak
values and local connectedness (degree centrality) in the left occipital
pole within the visual cortex explained 20% of observed variance. Fur-
ther, the same analysis revealed that local segregation (clustering
coefficient) within the right postcentral gyrus, part of the posterior
portion of the dorsal attention network covaried with curve peak
values, and such relationship explained 10% of the total variance. Last,
the stepwise regression showed that covariance between curve peak
values and the potential for control of information flow (betweenness
centrality) in the left precentral gyrus, part of the dorsal attention net-
work near the frontal eye field explained 26% of the total variance.
Figure 2 depicts the cortical nodes related to the curve pick values of
subjects' performance in the agency attribution task.
As for the curve SD, significant covariance between the consid-
ered measure and degree centrality in left and right frontal, parietal
and occipital regions was found as negative correlations (see Table 4).
Simple regression analyses demonstrated a single significant positive
correlation between the SD of individual curves and local segregation
(clustering coefficient) in the right superior parietal lobule, part of the
posterior portion of the dorsal attention network, and such relation-
ship explained 13% of total variance. Significant covariance was also
found in simple regressions between individual curves SD and
betweenness centrality measures both as negative and positive corre-
lations (see Table 4) in left frontal and occipital regions, and in a right
parietal node.
Subsequent stepwise regressions showed a negative correlation
between the curve SD and local connectedness in the left occipital
pole within the visual cortex, and this relationship explained 11% of
observed variance, while a complex of frontal and occipital nodes
within the left dorsal attention and visual networks was the most
influential in the information flow (betweenness centrality) related to
dispersion of delays determining self-agency attenuation, and such
relationship explained more than 40% of observed variance. Figure 3
shows cortical nodes related to the SD of subjects' performance in
the agency attribution task.
4 | DISCUSSION
Here we map the brain topological organization related to information
processing and signals integration essential for self-agency attribution.
From a behavioral point of view, we find that the time window for
self-agency attribution was 90–625 ms while feeling of control over
the effect decreased for delays ranging from 658 to 1,600 ms. While
no correlation was observed with measures of cognitive processes
known to impact the SoA (David et al., 2008), personal beliefs about
the self affected self-agency, as subjects characterized by the ten-
dency to be fearful, apprehensive and insecure have a broader action-
effect integration time-window. At the neural level, we demonstrate
that intrinsic brain processes linking somatosensory representations
to incoming visual and proprioceptive information sustain individual
consistency in attributing the effect to the self at a certain action-
effect delay. Conversely, extended self-agency over long-delayed
effects is grounded on the intrinsic mode of brain function designed
to organize information for visuomotor integration.
Indeed, connectedness at the local level in several cortical nodes
within sensory (visual), somatomotor and association networks
increases as consistency in the action-effect integration at a definite
delay increases. Specifically, the brain intrinsic functional organization
sustaining consistency in the action-effect integration at a certain
delay is characterized by high connectiveness in the secondary visual
cortex and by regional segregation in the primary somatosensory area.
Motor and attentive control areas do not influence the information
flow. Such functional network configuration, observable at rest,
implies that a biological function, that is, the brain's on-going intrinsic
activity, is essential when action-related perceptual and motor infor-
mation have to be combined as to derive a feeling of control over
external events.
This finding is highly informative for current models of SoA as it
unearths the brain circuit organization underlying the conscious attri-
bution of a delayed effect to one self's action. It also crucially demon-
strates that self-agency is grounded in the brain's intrinsic operations
involved in the maintenance of information and representations cen-
tral for interpreting and responding to the environment (Callard &
Margulies, 2011; Raichle, 2015). It additionally substantiates the
notion that the intrinsic mode of brain function is designed to orga-
nize information to register with changing regularities unfolding in the
environment (Raichle, 2015). As a matter of fact, rs activity may corre-
spond to continuous processing in the absence of stimuli or tasks,
geared to conscious integration of information yielding adaptability,
functionality and responsiveness to the challenges posed by the
external reality (Mišic & Sporns, 2016).
Specifically, two sensory areas (i.e., the secondary visual and the
primary somatosensory) are highly central and richly connected when
consistency in the action-effect integration at a certain delay is con-
sidered. Associative visual cortices have been previously implied in
SoA, particularly in the self-other distinction (Jeannerod, 2004) and
related to intentional aspects of agency awareness. As the success of
an action usually requires outcomes in the world, self-agency greatly
relies on the ability to visually monitor distal action effects. Moreover,
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TABLE 3 Statistical results and MNI coordinates of nodes of cortical regions related to the curve pick values of subjects' performance in the
agency attribution task
Cortical areas (Schaefer node label) Beta R2 Adj R2 F(1;35) p
MNI centroids coordinates (Network;




L_Occipital fusiform gyrus (LH Vis 2) .335 .126 .101 5.045 .031 −26 −76 −14
L_Occipital pole (LH Vis 4) .469 .22 .197 9.85 .003 −26 −96 −4
L_Lateral occipital cortex (LH Vis 8) .351 .123 .098 4.928 .033 −26 −88 20
L_Postcentral gyrus (LH DorsAttn_Post 4) .332 .11 .085 4.345 .044 −42 −34 48
L_Precuneous cortex (LH_DorsAttn_Post 5) .374 .14 .115 5.676 .023 −6 −60 56
L_Superior parietal lobule (LH_DorsAttn_Post 6) .399 .159 .135 6.626 .014 −22 −50 66
L_Angular gyrus (LH_Cont_Par 1) .328 .108 .082 4.225 .047 −38 −52 46
L_Lateral occipital cortex (LH_Default_Temp 4) .34 .116 .09 4.571 .04 −48 −64 36
L_Frontal pole (LH_Default_PFC 5) .364 .133 .108 5.362 .027 −8 48 42
L_ Superior frontal gyrus (LH_Default_PFC 7) .389 .151 .127 6.227 .017 −26 20 52
R_Occipital fusiform gyrus (RH_Vis 2) .401 .161 .137 6.692 .014 28 −66 −12
R_Occipital pole (RH_Vis 4) .45 .203 .18 8.903 .005 22 −96 −4
R_Lateral occipital cortex (RH_Vis 7) .426 .181 .158 7.751 .009 36 −82 16
R_Precentral gyrus (RH_SomMot 6) .425 .181 .157 7.717 .009 40 −22 60
R_Postcentral gyrus (RH_SomMot 7) .353 .125 .1 4.98 .032 30 −38 64
R_ Superior parietal lobule (RH_DorsAttn_Post 5) .458 .21 .188 9.314 .004 14 −52 66
R_Frontal pole (RH_Cont_PFCl 3) .333 .111 .086 4.372 .044 32 46 30
R_Precuneous cortex (RH_Cont_PFCmp 3) .338 .114 .089 4.504 .041 10 −66 42
R_Precuneous cortex (RH_Default_PCC 1) .326 .106 .081 4.164 .049 12 −54 14
Stepwise regression
L_Occipital pole (LH_Vis 4) .469 .22 .197 9.85 .003 −26 −96 −4
Clustering coefficient
Simple linear regressions
L_Inferior temporal gyrus (LH_Limbic_TempPole 2) .343 .117 .092 4.658 .038 −58 −32 −22
R_Lateral occipital cortex (RH_DorsAttn_Post 1) .358 .128 .103 5.154 .029 50 −62 16
R_Postcentral gyrus (RH_DorsAttn_Post 2) .366 .134 .109 5.421 .026 50 −24 42
Stepwise regression
R_Postcentral gyrus (RH_DorsAttn_Post 2) .366 .134 .109 5.421 .026 50 −24 42
Betweenness centrality
Simple linear regressions
L_Precentral gyrus (LH_DorsAttn_FEF 1) −.53 .28 .26 13.641 .001 −48 6 28
R_Precentral gyrus (RH_SomMot 6) .337 .113 .088 4.471 .042 40 −22 60
R_Cingulate gyrus (RH_Cont_PFCmp 1) −.37 .135 .111 5.482 .025 6 −28 34
Stepwise regression
L_Precentral gyrus (LH_DorsAttn_FEF 1) −.53 .28 .26 13.641 .001 −48 6 28
Note: Labels from the Yeo and Schaefer Atlas, available from: https://github.com/ThomasYeoLab/CBIG/blob/master/stable_projects/brain_parcellation/
Schaefer2018_LocalGlobal/Parcellations/MNI/Centroid_coordinates/Schaefer2018_100Parcels_7Networks_order_FSLMNI152_2mm.Centroid_RAS.csv.
Abbreviations: Cont_Par_1, First Parietal Control Network parcel; Cont_PFCl_3, third segment of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel;
Cont_PFCmp 1, Cont_PFCmp_3, first and third segment of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel; Default_PCC_1, fifth segment of the
Precuneal Default Network parcel; Default_PFC_5, Default_PFC_7, fifth and seventh segment of the Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel;
Default_Temp_4, fourth segment of the Temporal Default Network parcel; DorsAttn_FEF_1, fifth segment of the Frontal Eye Field Dorsal-Attentional Net-
work parcel; DorsAttn_Post_1, DorsAttn_Post_2, DorsAttn_Post_4, DorsAttn_Post_5, DorsAttn_Post_6, first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth segment of the
Posterior Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel; L/LH, left hemisphere; Limbic_TempPole_2, second segment of the Temporal part of the Limbic Network par-
cel; R/RH, right hemisphere; SomMot_6, SomMot_7, sixth and seventh segment of the Somatomotor Network parcel; Vis_2, Vis_4, Vis_7, Vis_8, second,
fourth, seventh and eighth segment of the Visual Network parcel.
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the secondary visual cortex, parallelly processing motion, objects loca-
tion and shape, is in the mainstream of the visual information flow
related to visual-motor integration. Indeed, the latter implies an
intensive cross-talk between cortical areas, since vision is used to plan
movements in a feed-forward fashion (Gallivan & Culham, 2015),
whereas action-specific plans influence visual feature processing
F IGURE 2 Nodes of cortical regions related to the curve pick values of subjects' performance in the Agency Attribution Task. 3D dorsal (left
panel) and ventral (right panel) views of nodes resulted as significantly related to consistency in self-agency attribution for: (a) Degree Centrality,
(b) Clustering Coefficient, and (c) Betweenness Centrality indices. Red dots: nodes with positive relationships between centrality indices and
behavioral measures; green dots: nodes with negative relationships between centrality indices and behavioral values; yellow lines: links between
nodes significantly related to each other (p < .05). Labels from the Yeo and Schaefer Atlas, available from: https://github.com/ThomasYeoLab/
CBIG/blob/master/stable_projects/brain_parcellation/Schaefer2018_LocalGlobal/Parcellations/MNI/Centroid_coordinates/Schaefer2018_
100Parcels_7Networks_order_FSLMNI152_2mm.Centroid_RAS.csv. Cont_Par_1, First Parietal Control Network parcel; Cont_PFCl_3, third
segment of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel; Cont_PFCmp_3, third segment of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Default
Network parcel; Default_PCC_1, Fifth segment of the Precuneal Default Network parcel; Default_PFC_5, Default_PFC_7, Fifth and seventh
segment of the Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel; Default_Temp_4, fourth segment of the Temporal Default Network parcel;
DorsAttn_Post_4, DorsAttn_Post_5, DorsAttn_Post_6, fourth, fifth and sixth segment of the Posterior Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel; LH,
Left Hemisphere; RH, Right Hemisphere; SomMot_6, SomMot_7, sixth and seventh segment of the Somatomotor Network parcel; Vis_2, Vis_4,
Vis_7, Vis_8, second, fourth, seventh and eighth segment of the Visual Network parcel
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TABLE 4 Statistical results and MNI coordinates of nodes of cortical regions related to the SD of subjects' performance in the agency
attribution task
Cortical areas (Schaefer node label) Beta R2 Adj R2 F(1;35) p
MNI centroids coordinates (Network;




L_Occipital pole (LH_Vis 4) −.373 .139 .115 5.672 .023 −26 −96 −4
L_Frontal pole (LH_Default_PFC 5) −.372 .138 .114 5.624 .023 −8 48 42
L_Precuneous cortex (LH_Default_PCC 1) −.346 .12 .095 4.774 .036 −12 −56 12
R_Precentral gyrus (RH_SomMot 6) −.345 .119 .094 4.721 .037 40 −22 60
R_Superior parietal lobule (RH_DorsAttn_Post 5) −.334 .111 .086 4.392 .043 14 −52 66
R_Precuneous cortex (RH_Default_PCC 1) −.33 .109 .083 4.277 .046 12 −54 14
Stepwise regression
L_Occipital pole (LH_Vis 4) −.373 .139 .115 5.672 .023 −26 −96 −4
Clustering coefficient
Simple linear regressions
R_Superior parietal lobule (RH_DorsAttn_Post 5) .394 .156 .131 6.447 .016 14 −52 66
Betweenness centrality
Simple linear regressions
L_Occipital pole (LH_Vis 5) .463 .215 .192 9.576 .004 −6 −92 −2
L_Precentral gyrus (LH_DorsAttn_FEF 1) .536 .287 .267 14.096 .001 −48 6 28
R_Superior parietal lobule (RH_DorsAttn_Post 5) −.382 .146 .122 5.981 .02 14 −52 66
Stepwise regression
L_Occipital pole (LH_Vis 5) .673 .453 .421 F(2;34) = 14.09 <.001 −6 −92 −2
L_Precentral gyrus (LH_DorsAttn_FEF 1) −48 6 28
Note: Labels from the Yeo and Schaefer Atlas, available from: https://github.com/ThomasYeoLab/CBIG/blob/master/stable_projects/brain_parcellation/
Schaefer2018_LocalGlobal/Parcellations/MNI/Centroid_coordinates/Schaefer2018_100Parcels_7Networks_order_FSLMNI152_2mm.Centroid_RAS.csv.
Abbreviations: Default_PCC_1, fifth segment of the Precuneal Default Network parcel; Default_PFC_5, Default_PFC_7, fifth and seventh segment of the
Prefrontal Cortex Default Network parcel; DorsAttn_FEF_1, fifth segment of the Frontal Eye Field Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel; DorsAttn_Post_5,
fifth segment of the Posterior Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel; LH, left hemisphere; RH, right hemisphere; SomMot_6, sixth and seventh segment of the
Somatomotor Network parcel; Vis_4, Vis_5, fourth and fifth segment of the Visual Network parcel.
F IGURE 3 Nodes of cortical regions related to the SD of subjects' performance in the Agency Attribution Task. 3D dorsal (left panel) and
ventral (right panel) views of nodes resulted as significantly related to the time window extent for self-agency attribution considering
Betweenness Centrality indices. Red dots: nodes with positive relationships between centrality indices and behavioral measures; green dots:
nodes with negative relationships between centrality indices and behavioral values; yellow lines: links between nodes significantly related to each
other (p < .05). Labels from the Yeo and Schaefer Atlas, available from: https://github.com/ThomasYeoLab/CBIG/blob/master/stable_projects/
brain_parcellation/Schaefer2018_LocalGlobal/Parcellations/MNI/Centroid_coordinates/Schaefer2018_100Parcels_7Networks_order_
FSLMNI152_2mm.Centroid_RAS.csv. DorsAttn_FEF_1, fifth segment of the Frontal Eye Field Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel;
DorsAttn_Post_5, fifth segment of the Posterior Dorsal-Attentional Network parcel; LH, Left Hemisphere; RH, Right Hemisphere; Vis_5, fifth
segment of the Visual Network parcel
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(Gutteling, Park, Kenemans, & Neggers, 2013; Monaco, Chen,
Menghi, & Douglas Crawford, 2018). The fact that this area showed
the highest number of connections with other cortical nodes when
measures of consistency in the action-effect integration are consid-
ered, indicates that the state of preparedness and functional connec-
tivity of this sensory region is crucial when competing internal and
external cues have to be integrated as to derive a sense of control
over external events. This observation fits well with the multifactorial
account of SoA (Synofzik et al., 2008a; Vosgerau & Synofzik, 2012)
assuming that all kinds of action-related perceptual and motor infor-
mation -and their congruence- are combined as to form an agency
attribution. It also identifies the secondary visual area as the source of
the external signals, which permit self-agency attribution for delayed
visual effects.
However, the observed clustered connectivity around the primary
somatosensory area, which strengthened as the feeling of control
over external events at a certain delay increased, suggests that a spe-
cialized processing allows the functional segregation necessary for
integrating perceptual and cognitive states into explicit self-agency
attribution (Weiss, Tsakiris, Haggard, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2014). Partic-
ularly, the intrinsic brain's operations sustaining perceived control
over subsequent consequences seems to be mainly involved in the
maintenance of somatosensory representations as to link them to
incoming visual and proprioceptive information. Activity in somato-
sensory areas is necessary for the sensorimotor transformations and
integration assumed by the comparator model (Blakemore, Frith, &
Wolpert, 2001; Frith et al., 2000; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). How-
ever, the cue integration theory (Moore & Fletcher, 2012), posits that
SoA comes about by many different agency cues, which are con-
stantly weighted according to their reliability in a given situation. Evi-
dence from perceptual research demonstrated that the brain often
integrates its multisensory information in the same way, such that
each cue is weighted according to its precision (van Dam, Parise, &
Ernst, 2015). Therefore, the rich complex functional interactions
(expressed by the high local clustering coefficient) here observed in
the primary somatosensory area as a function of consistency in attrib-
uting the effect to the self, can be assumed as the neural basis of the
cue integration mechanism for inferring self-agency (Moore,
Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). Actually, an area comprised within the
dorsal attention network and involved in controlling visual attention
activation as to re-orient it in case of changes in visual stimuli, is the
less influential over the flow of information when consistency in self-
agency is considered. This suggests that, when a delay in the visual
effect is somehow expected, attention reorienting is unnecessary and
areas devoted to it become less central in the information
transmission.
Nevertheless, although we hypothesize that the time flexible self-
agency experience arises from the optimal multisensory integration
occurring in a sensory area, this cue-integrated SoA is probably not an
instance of perception, but rather a composite of thought/judgment
(Reddy, 2019).
Indeed, by systematically injecting delays between the action and
its visual consequence, we find a broader sense of agency over the
effect than previously reported (Farrer et al., 2013). Crucially to the
present finding, external agency (Farrer & Frith, 2002) can be more
flexible to temporal discrepancies than body agency. Other external
cognitive processes such as the salience of the contingency, or per-
sonal beliefs about the nature of mechanisms mediating actions and
effects, can dominate and overwrite the explicit judgment of control
(Karsh, Eitam, Mark, & Higgins, 2016; Osumi et al., 2019; Wegner &
Wheatley, 1999; Wen, 2019). Actually, we find that subjects charac-
terized by the tendency to be fearful, apprehensive and insecure have
a broader action-effect integration time-window. This indicates that
previous beliefs about oneself impacted the explicit self-agency attri-
bution. Interestingly, in clinical populations characterized by an
enhanced estimation of the self-agency experience and inflated sense
of responsibility (e.g., patients with obsessive compulsive disorder)
(Gentsch, Schtz-Bosbach, Endrass, & Kathmann, 2012; Rhéaume,
Ladouceur, Freeston, & Letarte, 1995; Sookman, Pinard, &
Beck, 2001) the aberrant sense of agency was related to the harm
avoidance dimension. The exaggerated anticipation of negative conse-
quences, and the dysfunctional belief that doing nothing to avoid
them is equal to causing harm, may have led patients to think that
outcomes were under their personal control (Belayachi & Van Der
Linden, 2010; Salkovskis, 1996). Accordingly, in our subjects we find
that the personality trait of self-directedness is related to extended
perceived control over the visual effect at increasing temporal
visuomotor incongruence. Indeed, in individuals with high confidence
in their own efficacy, and characterized by an internal locus of control
(Rotter, 1966), uncertainty is restricted to a narrow range of delay.
Once again, this observation confirms the hypothesis that previous
beliefs of control and responsibility can influence different aspects of
the self-agency experience (Synofzik et al., 2008b), thus impacting
explicit attribution JoA.
Intriguingly, the extended self-agency experience is sustained by
a specific brain intrinsic functional organization characterized by
decreased connectiveness in the secondary visual area, as the time-
window for self-agency attribution becomes broader, and by regional
segregation in the superior parietal lobule. A network comprising the
primary visual cortex and a region roughly centered on the frontal eye
fields is the most influential over the information flow. Hence, an
intensive cross-talk between the primary visual area and regions
within the dorsal attention network is needed for controlling, and pos-
sibly facilitating, the transmission of information relevant for sustain-
ing the perceived control over delayed effects. Actually, the frontal
eye fields are responsible for attentional orienting, visual awareness
and enhanced perception (Moore, 2001; Vernet, Quentin, Chanes,
Mitsumasu, & Valero-Cabré, 2014). As they exert a top-down modula-
tion over ongoing visual processing (Bar et al., 2006; Silvanto, Lavie, &
Walsh, 2006; Thompson, Biscoe, & Sato, 2005), the brain intrinsic
activity within the network here observed is essential for sustaining
detection and processing of long-delayed visual effects. Moreover,
extended self-agency is segregated in a parietal region within the dor-
sal attention posterior network, an area known to contribute to
explicit judgments about action consequences and involved in
detecting deviations from expectancy (Kuhn, Brass, & Haggard, 2013).
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This implies that in subjects showing an extended temporal grouping
between their action and the effect, less weight is attributed to inter-
nal signals. Therefore, cognitive inference of self-agency is not based
on the simple “readout” of low-level indicators (Weiss et al., 2014),
but rather on cognitive visuo-attentional and visuomotor integration
processes. Previous findings on the role played by multisensory inte-
gration mechanisms in body representation (Costantini et al., 2016)
suggest that visuo-proprioceptive integration is affected by the differ-
ent temporal resolution of the proprioceptive system (Vroomen &
Keetels, 2010). Moreover, the visual and sensorimotor systems have
different sensitivity to asynchrony, as the partial match between
intentions and proprioceptive feed-back may overcome SoA, even
though the visual feedback is delayed (Shimada, Qi, & Hiraki, 2010). It
is therefore possible, that in order to extend the time-window for
self-agency, the visuo-attentional system prioritizes and facilitates the
flow of visual information, as to increase the probability that it will be
integrated in the explicit agency judgment. Multisensory integration
processes for long-delayed effects would then take place in the area
closer to the sensory region receiving the visual delayed input
(Shimada et al., 2010), that is, the parietal lobe, to which visual infor-
mation is preferably transferred. However, inter-individual differences
in temporal sensitivity to multisensory integration (Costantini
et al., 2016) may have determined the inter-subject differences here
observed in the action-effect integration time-window. Though no
correlation was found between time discrimination accuracy and the
extent of the time-window for self-agency attribution, the fact that
temporal acuity is slightly different for filled (as in the temporal dis-
crimination task) and empty (as in the agency attribution task) inter-
vals cannot completely rule out this alternative hypothesis.
Before some concluding remarks, we have to acknowledge a few
study limitations. First, the present investigation is limited to explicit
aspects of the sense of agency, thus impeding any consideration on
more implicit, unconscious factors (e.g., action selection, intentions,
effort, etc.) influencing external agency. Nevertheless, the correlation
here investigated between the brain topological organization at rest
and the behavioral phenotype might have captured even low-level
processes involved in SoA. Indeed, the functional measure adopted is
unconfounded by processing of specific stimuli and cognitive
demands, as resting state networks are more “natural” and “core” with
respect to the functional division derived from task-evoked patterns
of activity (Callard & Margulies, 2011). Second, the explored co-
variation between the brain organization at rest and explicit self-
agency attribution might be regarded as inherently exploratory. How-
ever, centrality measures provide connectivity maps within the entire
gray matter, enabling investigation of highly distributed functions and
emphasizing the collective organized operation of entire cognitive sys-
tems (Mišic & Sporns, 2016). Actually, network theory constitutes a
useful framework in which to consider the brain in terms of its struc-
ture and function.
Additionally, the correlation between measures of resting state
activity (when -by definition- no goal directed mental activity and
minimal perceptive input are present) and behavioral performance is
debated, and might be regarded as minimally informative respect to
processes that are inherently task-related. Nevertheless, the function
here investigated presumes an inner-oriented mental activity while
the brain's intrinsic resting-state activity has a preliminary influence to
later processing of agency cues (Robinson et al., 2016). Since we
intended to explore the relative contribution of internal and external
mental contents on self-agency attribution, including the brain resting
state activity (Robinson et al., 2016), the adopted functional measure
seemed the best methodological option. Moreover, the brain's sponta-
neous activity, and more specifically, its spatiotemporal dynamics, play
a crucial role in yielding the respective mental content (Northoff
et al., 2019), and exploring the rest-stimulus interaction is crucial to
the elucidation of the brain's contribution to self-related processes
(Huang et al., 2015; Northoff, Qin, & Nakao, 2010) including SoA.
However, future studies comparing the brain's intrinsic activity to its
extrinsic (i.e., task-induced or stimulus-induced) activity during agency
attribution are warranted as to delineate the neural network contrib-
uting to the self-agency experience in both states.
Finally, the studied sample was not numerous, and this consti-
tutes an additional potential limitation of the present investigation.
Nevertheless, the computed correlations between behavioral mea-
sures of perceived control over the effect and centrality indices
always resulted in intermediate to large effect sizes (Cohen's
d (Cohen, 1988) between 0.79 and 1.81; η2 (Richardson, 2011)
between 0.13 and 0.45), thus suggesting that the performed analysis
was not underpowered.
To sum up, here we provide unique experimental evidence that
perceived control over subsequent delayed effects is based on
intrinsic brain processes that link somatosensory representations
residing in the primary somatosensory area to incoming visual and
proprioceptive information. Conversely, extended self-agency over
long-delayed effects is grounded on the intrinsic mode of brain func-
tion designed to organize information for visuomotor integration.
We also demonstrate that whereas the self-agency experience arises
from the optimal multisensory integration occurring in a sensory
area, these internal non-conceptual computations are available to
other cognitive systems for further processing. Indeed, visuomotor
integration processes and previous beliefs regarding the person
impacted the explicit propositional representation of the self as an
external agent.
These findings bear important clinical implications since activity
attenuation in somatosensory cortices and aberrant resting-state
activity in self-referential regions of the brain of individuals with
schizophrenia have been shown to impact their attribution of agency
(Robinson et al., 2016; Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005),
being also related to current hallucinatory severity (Shergill
et al., 2005). Additionally, the enhanced estimation of the self-agency
experience in patients with obsessive compulsive disorder was proven
to be related to beliefs of control and responsibility (Belayachi & Van
Der Linden, 2010; Salkovskis & McGuire, 2003). In this view, the
observed positive association between resting state activity in
somatosensory areas and explicit self-agency attribution in healthy
subjects indicates that self-agency is sustained by a specific brain
intrinsic functional organization. This paves the way for the clinical
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and experimental validation of this neuroscientific method in studying
the phenomenology of agency and sense of self. The demonstration
that psychological/evaluative aspects of the self influenced attribution
JoAs in healthy subjects supports the hypothesis that external cogni-
tive processes, such as personal beliefs, can dominate and overwrite
the explicit judgment of control over external events. Such observa-
tion opens up the possibility for modulating the aberrant self-agency
experience in clinical populations by modifying dysfunctional beliefs
or by altering the temporal structure of rs brain activity using neuro-
physiological techniques. This has crucial clinical relevance, especially
in all the clinical conditions in which both rs activity and sense of
agency are altered, including, but not limited to, schizophrenia. Indeed,
recent theorizations already assumed that alterations in global brain's
dynamics at rest underlie various psychopathological symptoms, thus
suggesting that the brain's particular spatial and temporal structure at
rest can be presumed as diagnostic or therapeutic markers in psycho-
pathology (Northoff, 2016b, 2016c).
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